Tsaar Nicolaas II en koning George V
“The problems of evaluation were never more obvious than with respect to Nicholas II. Quite rightfully, the British noted that ‘[t]he Emperor is the all important factor in foreign policy’. But they were never able to come to grips with the personality of the elusive monarch. In such circumstances, wishful thinking could take over. Since close Anglo-Russian relations were desired, the best possible interpretation was put on Nicholas’s every utterance and action. Perhaps unconsciously sharing the traditional view of the Russian peasantry that all ills could be attributed tot the Tsar’s officials rather than to the monarch himself, the British tended to view Nicholas as influenced by the last person who advised him. * This allowed them to ignore the fact that Nicholas very much ran his own ship, something that the peace negotiations in the Russo-Japanese War [1904-1905] underlined. It was not until during the First World War that Robert Bruce Lockhart, the acting British consul in Moscow, got closer to the truth : ’the Emperor is by no means stupid, talks well and to the point, and is fully aware of what he is doing … he is obstinate and vindictive, and quite obsessed with the idea that autocracy is his and his children’s by Divine right’. [Lockhart to Grey, disp.2, 22 Jan. 1916]. But to have accepted this view would have ran counter to the British belief – hope may be more accurate – in Nicholas II as a closet liberal. Nicholas’s evident disregard for the Duma, a body which for the British was the touchstone of a favourable future for Russia, was largely ignored or blamed on the machinations of his advisors. The required Nicholas became the accepted one.” (K. Neilson, The British and the last Tsar. British policy and Russia, 1894-1917 [New York 1995], p. 83)
* In June 1905 Hardinge argued, that the person who saws Nicholas last ‘is likely to have the most influence upon him’. (idem, p. 56)