Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reported to the President on Arpil 20, 1965, from Honolulu, where he had just met General Westmoreland and Ambassador Maxwell Taylor on Vietnam. (Taped conversation between LBJ and RM): Robert MacNamara: I think we can all be in agreement that we’ve got to do more to win in the South. I think the introduction of US troops that will be involved will be agreed upon by the various parties. … LBJ: What do they think about all these statements about the Chinese coming in? … RM: none of us feel that the Chinese are likely to come in, in the near term. They are reasonably optimistic that over the next three to six months, with additional US combat troops in there … they feel that they can sufficiently stiffen the South Vietnamese and strengthen their forces to show Hanoi that Hanoi cannot win in the South. It won’t be that the South Vietnamese can win. But it will be clear to Hanoi that Hanoi can’t win. And this is one of the objectives we’re driving for. There is general agreement we reached this morning that it would be unwise in the near future … to bomb Hanoi, Haiphong, or any of that area. …Despite some … favorable signs [the Vietcong kill had been two weeks ‘very high’] … there is … this very large Vietcong buildup over the last several months and the concentration of Vietcong strength in the center of the country, which would break out at any time and cause serious trouble to us. And they’re very much afraid of some catastrophic loss at Bienhoa or Danang or one of these areas. And it’s to protect against that that they now agree that there should be some US combat troops introduced … I mean, in the next 90 to 120 days. Beyond that, there is some disagreement as to how much eventual US troop involvement would be required in South Vietnam. … They feel much better [about the stability of the South Vietnamese government of Prime Minister Quat] … To avoid possible catastrophe at Bienhoa, where we have a huge concentration of equipment and US forces, and also at Danang, I think we would recommend to you … introduction of a brigade at Bienhoa and several additional battalions at enclaves along the coast. This [is] both to protect us against catastrophe and also to relieve some of the South Vietnamese and … allow some of our units to participate in counterinsurgency operations. And as a result of all this, to show the North Vietnamese that they can’t win in the South. … (M. Beschlosse, Reaching for Glory [New York 2001], p. 282-183)